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PROTECTING SUBJECT CHILDREN IN FAMILY COURT AND 
BEYOND: THE NECESSITY TO UTILIZE IDENTICAL 
CONFIDENTIALITY MEASURES BETWEEN ARTICLE 6 
LINCOLN HEARINGS AND ARTICLE 10 LINCOLN HEARINGS  
Bradley Kaufman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Family Reunification is defined as the “process of returning 
children in temporary out-of-home care to their families of origin.”1  
Reunification is the ultimate goal and objective sought for families 
whose children were removed from the family home.2  In Custody and 
Visitation proceedings (Article 6 of the Family Court Act of New 
York)3, a Family Court judge has jurisdiction and authority to award 
custody of the subject children to family members other than the 
children’s parents, such as grandparents, if the familial circumstances 
warrant such an order.4  This means parents will temporarily, 
sometimes even permanently, be stripped of their custody and 
visitation rights over their own children if a judge determines the 
arrangement will be in the children’s best interest.5  Similar orders can 
 
*J.D. Candidate 2018, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A. Criminology, 
State University of New York College at Cortland.  I would like to thank Danielle Schwager, 
Attorney for the Child, for providing me with both practical and educational guidance 
throughout the entirety of this process.  I would also like to thank the Honorable Conrad D. 
Singer, Nassau County Family Court judge, who first introduced me to Lincoln hearings 
during my summer 2016 internship.  Additionally, I would like to thank Christopher J. 
Chimeri, Esq. who provided me with my initial exposure to the practice of family and 
matrimonial law.  I would further like to thank Rhona Mae Amorado for her diligence and 
guidance during the editing stages.  Lastly, I would like to thank my family, especially my 
wife, for all the motivation, love and support they have provided.  
1 CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, Family Reunification: What the Evidence 
Shows 1, 2 (2011), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/familyreunification.pdf. 
2 Id. at 2.   
3 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 651 (West, Westlaw through L.2017, ch. 1 to 6). 
4 Id.   
5 Id.  
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also be issued in Abuse and Neglect Proceedings (Article 10 of the 
Family Court Act of New York)6, resulting in temporary or permanent 
removal of the children from their parents’ homes to be placed in the 
custody of another suitable relative, if the placement is in the children’s 
best interest.7  The ultimate goal for families experiencing a removal 
scenario in Abuse and Neglect matters is reunification of the family in 
the foreseeable future.8  Generally, federal law in the United States 
requires the ultimate goal of family reunification to be achieved within 
twelve months of removal of the children from the family residence.9  
The reunification decision is, of course, subject to a best-interest-of-
the-child analysis.10    
The Children, Youth and Families Act 200511 (CYFA) from 
the Victorian Parliament of Australia12 provides clear “best-interest 
principles”13 for children.  CYFA also offers considerations to be 
weighed to further the children’s best interests regarding the 
reunification of a family.  For example, CYFA provides that “when 
determining whether a decision or action is in the best interests of the 
child, the need to protect the child from harm, to protect his or her 
rights and to promote his or her development . . . must always be 
 
6 § 1055 (Westlaw). 
7 Id.   
8 Id. § 1055 (iii)(C). 
9 Stacey M. Saunders-Adams, Reunification and Reentry in Child Welfare: A Systematic 
Review and Meta-analysis, 24 NAT’L SYMPOSIUM ON DOCTORAL RESEARCH IN SOC. WORK 1, 
1 (2012), https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/ 1811/52994/24_5_saunders-adams_ 
paper_kb.pdf. 
10 § 1055 (Westlaw). 
11 Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Act No. 96/2005) ch 1 s 10 pt 1.2 div 2 (Austl.) 
[hereinafter CYFA]. 
12 The author decided to use Australia’s “best-interest principles” in this Note because the 
CYFA lists a plethora of considerations that the judge must follow when making a decision in 
Family Court proceedings.  For example, the best-interest principles in the CYFA span 
approximately three pages in the Act, which includes subsections one through three, with 
subsection three having subsections a through r. See CYFA, supra note 11.  All subsections 
and sub-subsections contain thorough and specific considerations a judge must follow with 
“any other relevant consideration” being the last consideration mentioned. See CYFA, supra 
note 11, at para 3r.  This list, although illustrative, is not exhaustive, but provides a judge with 
a myriad of additional considerations he may not have ordinarily considered if it was not 
otherwise explicitly listed. See CYFA, supra note 11, at para 3.  By contrast, New York’s best-
interest principles lists approximately eight bullet points of considerations for a judge to 
evaluate in making his decision.  Best Interest of the Child, NYCOURTS, 
www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/family/bestInterest.shtml (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).  Although 
not an exhaustive list either, it provides less guidance and significantly fewer factors to 
consider from the onset of such a proceeding.  Id.  
13 CYFA, supra note 11, at ch 1 s 10 pt 1.2 div 2 para 3.  
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considered.”14  Additionally, CYFA states that consideration relevant 
to the need “to strengthen, preserve and promote positive relationships 
between the child and the child’s parent, family members and persons 
significant to the child”15 must be assessed to determine if a decision 
or an action will be in the child’s best interest.16  New York should 
adopt principles akin to the Australian principles from the CYFA to 
further its goal of promoting and maintaining the children’s best 
interest in Family Court matters.  
The best interest of the children principle is fully incorporated 
in Custody and Visitation (Article 6) proceedings.17  For instance, 
subject children who testify do so in a private in camera setting, 
usually in a judge’s chambers, with only the judge, the Attorney for 
the Child, and a court reporter present.18  The transcript of the 
testimony is sealed and only accessible by the presiding Family Court 
judge and the Appellate judge, upon appeal.19  This procedure, known 
as a “true” Lincoln hearing, protects the children from the potential 
trauma of testifying in open court, especially with their parents 
present.20  In addition, the sealing of the transcript ensures full 
confidentiality so the sensitive content of the children’s testimony will 
not be revealed.21  These protections are in place to prevent the 
possibility of jeopardizing or further jeopardizing a parent, a child, or 
a parent-child relationship, which would be contrary to the child’s 
best-interest principle.  
Abuse and Neglect (Article 10) proceedings, on the other hand, 
are not as rigid with respect to confidentiality and the best-interest-of-
the-child protections.22  Subject children testifying in Article 10 
proceedings may testify in a Lincoln hearing setting, with some 
caveats, such as needing the consent of all parties to the litigation.23  
The attorney for each parent is permitted to be present and ask 
 
14 CYFA, supra note 11, at ch 1 s 10 pt 1.2 div 2 para 2. 
15 CYFA, supra note 11, at ch 1 s 10 pt 1.2 div 2 para 3b. 
16 CYFA, supra note 11, at ch 1 s 10 pt 1.2 div. 2 para 3b. 
17 Lincoln v. Lincoln, 247 N.E.2d 659, 660 (N.Y. 1969). 
18 Id. at 661.  
19 CALLAGHAN’S FAMILY COURT LAW & PRACTICE § 4:12 (Westlaw 2016 ed. 2016) 
[hereinafter CALLAGHAN’S §4:12]. 
20 Id. 
21 Verry v. Verry, 880 N.Y.S.2d 730, 731 (3d Dep’t 2009) (quoting Matter of Hrusovsky v. 
Benjamin, 710 N.Y.S.2d 198, 201 (3d Dep’t 2000)).  
22 CALLAGHAN’ § 4:12, supra note 19.  
23 In re Justin C., 903 N.Y.S.2d, 806, 807 (3d Dep’t 2010).  
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questions while the children testify in chambers.24  The transcript of 
the children’s testimony during these proceedings is unsealed and can 
be accessed by both parties, eliminating the confidential nature seen in 
Article 6 proceedings.25  These hearings are known as “modified” 
Lincoln hearings.26  A rationale for removing full confidentiality in 
these hearings is to protect the parents’ due process rights in abuse and 
neglect cases.27  This would allow the parent to refute any allegations 
made against him or her in these proceedings.28  
This argument has, in turn, persuaded the legislature and judges 
to allow for the softer confidentiality measures that have been 
utilized.29  However, these softer confidentiality measures may have 
an adverse effect in protecting the best interest of the children, 
especially in achieving the goal of family reunification,30 because of 
the “emotional fallout or retaliation that might ensue if their 
disclosures are revealed.”31  Because the best interests of the children 
should be at the forefront of both Article 6 and Article 10 proceedings, 
identical measures of confidentiality should be applied in both 
proceedings to truly maintain a child’s best interest.  
This Note will argue that true and modified Lincoln hearings 
should require identical confidentiality measures to protect the 
children and their best interests while within the four walls of Family 
Court for Article 6 and Article 10 proceedings.  The matching 
confidentiality procedures would protect a child’s best interest to the 
fullest, outside of the Family Court, leading to an easier transition for 
the custody and visitation arrangements in Article 6 proceedings and 
expediting the ultimate goal of family reunification in Article 10 
proceedings.32   
This Note will be divided into six sections.  Section II of this 
Note will discuss the transitional history of constitutional protections 
guaranteed in criminal cases into civil proceedings.  Specifically, it 
will discuss the recognition of constitutional due process protections 
for juveniles, the transition of viewing proceedings involving juveniles 
 
24 CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19. 
25 CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19. 
26 CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19. 
27 Justin C., 903 N.Y.S.2d at 809-10. 
28 Id. at 809-10 
29 Id. at 806.  
30 Sandra S. v. Abdul S., 914 N.Y.S.2d 858, 863 (Kings Cnty Fam. Ct. 2010). 
31 Id. at 859.   
32 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 860, 861.  
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more as civil in nature, and the further expansion of constitutional 
protections in all civil cases.  Section III will provide a discussion of 
the Family Court System in New York.  This section will define the 
doctrine of parens patriae33 by giving a brief background of the 
doctrine.  It will also address the creation of the Family Court Act in 
New York, which will include a general overview of Article 6 and 
Article 10 proceedings of the Family Court Act.  Section IV will 
analyze the procedures involved in Lincoln hearings with respect to 
Article 6 and Article 10 of the New York Family Court Act.  Section 
V will argue that the full confidentiality utilized in true Lincoln 
hearings should also be applied in “modified” Lincoln hearings to 
protect the best interest of the child in both Article 6 and Article 10 
proceedings, especially to achieve the ultimate goal of reunification of 
the family in Article 10 most efficiently.  Lastly, Section VI will 
summarize the objective of this Note, which is for the Family Court to 
implement identical measures of confidentiality for the best interest of 
the child in Article 6 and Article 10 proceedings.  Utilizing identical 
confidentiality measures would alleviate tension in custody and 
visitation arrangements in Article 6 proceedings and achieve 
reunification of the family in Article 10 proceedings.  
II. HISTORY OF HOW CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS MADE ITS WAY 
INTO CIVIL PROCEEDINGS.  
It is well-settled law that, “Family Court Procedure is not 
governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure.”34  In 1948, however, 
the United States Supreme Court case, Haley v. State of Ohio,35 was 
pivotal in introducing criminal procedure with respect to due process 
of law to matters pertaining to juveniles.36  Furthermore, Haley first 
recognized the necessity of criminal procedure in the juvenile arena by 
adopting constitutionally protected rights previously afforded only to 
adults.37  
 
 
33 “Parent of one’s country.”  This provides a Court with authority to intervene to safeguard 
individuals who are not able to do so on their own, especially children.  LEGAL DICTIONARY, 
https://legaldictionary.net/parens-patriae (last visited Feb. 26, 2017). 
34 In re D., 261 N.E.2d 627, 630 (N.Y. 1970). 
35 332 U.S. 596 (1948). 
36 Id. at 599. 
37 Id. at 600, 601. 
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A. The Beginnings of Constitutional Due Process 
Protections for Juvenile Offenders  
In Haley, fifteen-year-old John Harvey Haley was allegedly 
serving as the lookout for two acquaintances that robbed and shot a 
candy storeowner.38  He was arrested five days after this incident 
occurred.39  Haley was convicted and sentenced to life in prison by the 
Trial Court in Ohio, for first-degree murder of the storeowner.40  
During Haley’s arrest, police removed him from his house and took 
him into custody to question him at the police station.41  The police, by 
five to six rotating officers, questioned Haley for approximately five 
hours, between the hours of midnight and 5:00 a.m., without any 
parent, attorney, or friend present.42  At approximately 5:00 a.m., 
Haley confessed after being shown alleged confessions from his 
accomplices.43  Neither Haley’s mother nor the attorney Haley’s 
mother retained to represent him was permitted to see Haley during the 
questioning.44  Haley gave a written confession on a form in which the 
first line read, “We want to inform you of your constitutional rights, 
the law gives you the right to make this statement or not as you see 
fit.”45 
The Haley Court stated that the interrogation methods used to 
obtain Haley’s confession did not conform to due process provided by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.46  Further, the Court reasoned that, 
“Neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods 
which flout constitutional requirements of due process of law.”47  In 
other words, the police utilized tactics on Haley, “a child by means 
which the law should not sanction,”48 which would violate due process 
if utilized on a similarly situated adult, and thus, Haley’s confession 
cannot stand as it was not given voluntarily.49   
 
38 Id. at 597.  
39 Id. 
40 Haley, 332 U.S. at 597.   
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 598. 
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 600. 
45 Haley, 332 U.S. at 598. 
46 Id. at 599. 
47 Id. at 601. 
48 Id.  
   49   Id. 
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Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion averred, “I do not 
believe that even capital offenses by boys of fifteen should be dealt 
with according to the conventional criminal procedure.”50  In other 
words, Justice Frankfurter saw Haley as a vulnerable, helpless 
adolescent who was not capable of withstanding the interrogation 
methods that the police used against him like an adult could.51  Justice 
Frankfurter proferred that a young individual like Haley would 
succumb to the stress during questioning and would be more likely to 
give an involuntary confession regardless of his true guilt or innocence 
in the matter.52  Justice Frankfurter, along with the rest of the majority, 
explained that Haley’s confession was not valid because of the lack of 
due process protections provided to Haley during the questioning.53  
Thus, the Court effectively recognized that children and adults alike 
must be afforded constitutional protections to avoid involuntary or 
coerced confessions.54  Even though the Supreme Court recognized 
that it gives States the freedom to choose “their methods of criminal 
procedure,”55 the methods chosen cannot be in “conflict with deeply 
rooted feelings of the community.”56  Therefore, the Court reversed 
Haley’s conviction because of the lack of constitutional due process 
protections available to a teenager, like Haley, during a police 
interrogation.57   
B. The Shift Towards Treating Juvenile Offender 
Proceedings as Civil Matters  
Juvenile delinquency proceedings after Haley started to be 
viewed as more “civil in nature and not criminal”58 because of the 
Juvenile Court’s role as a parental figure or guardian to act in the best 
interest of the children in its jurisdiction.59  Accordingly, juvenile 
courts are expected to act in the best interest of the children and should 
 
50 Haley, 332 U.S. at 602-03 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
51 Id. at 603, 604.  
52 Id. at 603. 
53 Id. at 604-05.  
54 Id. at 601. 
55 Haley, 332 U.S. at 604. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 601.  
58 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966). 
59 Also known as the doctrine of parens patriae.  LEGAL DICTIONARY, supra note 33; see 
also Kent, 383 U.S. at 554-55.   
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not simply “adjudicat[e] criminal conduct.”60  However, the same 
procedures should apply in the juvenile courts, as in adult criminal 
courts, to ensure “due process and fair treatment for juveniles.”61   
In Kent v. United States,62 fourteen-year-old Morris A. Kent, 
Jr., was apprehended for a series of residential break-ins and attempted 
thefts of handbags.63  The Juvenile Court placed Kent on probation.64  
Two years later, Kent (age sixteen), went into a woman’s residence in 
the District of Columbia, stole her wallet and raped her.65  These 
offenses, while Kent was still on probation, consequently placed Kent 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court.66  However, the 
Juvenile Court judge waived jurisdiction, without having conducted a 
full investigation.67  In addition, the judge denied Kent’s counsel 
access to Kent’s social service file, which Kent’s counsel argued was 
vital in providing Kent “with effective assistance of counsel.”68  
Ultimately, the judge turned Kent over to the District Court for the 
District of Columbia, an adult criminal court.69  
Pursuant to the waiver provision of the District of Columbia 
Juvenile Court Act, a “Petitioner [wa]s entitled to a hearing, including 
access by his counsel to the social records and probation or similar 
reports, which presumably are considered by the court, and to a 
statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court’s decision.”70  The Court 
reasoned that these statutory requirements, which invoke 
“constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of 
counsel,”71 are necessary.  Furthermore, the hearing Kent was entitled 
to does not have to include all criminal procedures expected in criminal 
trials, but “must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair 
treatment.”72  The Court acknowledged that attorneys “have a 
legitimate interest in the protection of the child,”73 and the denial of 
 
60 Kent, 383 U.S. at 554. 
61 Id. at 562.  
62 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
63 Id. at 543. 
64 Id. 
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
67 Kent, 383 U.S. at 546.  
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 557.  
71 Id.  
72 Kent, 383 U.S. at 562.  
73 Id. at 546, 563. 
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 3, Art. 20
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/20
2017 PROTECTING SUBJECT CHILDREN 1197 
access to a juvenile’s social service report and/or record is an 
impediment to the effective assistance of legal counsel for a juvenile.74     
The emphasis on due process for juvenile delinquents, 
specifically in New York, came into focus in the 1966 Court of 
Appeals case, In re W. & S..75  In In re W., twelve-year-old Gregory 
W. was taken into custody at approximately 5:30 p.m. for questioning 
following a brutal assault in Brooklyn two weeks earlier.76  Gregory 
confessed to the assault after being questioned until approximately five 
or six the following morning.77  Throughout the questioning, Gregory 
had very little sleep, did not have a lawyer, nor were his parents 
present.78  However, after Gregory was placed in Youth House,79 the 
interrogating police officer was informed that Gregory was confined 
in the Kings County Hospital security ward at the time of the crime 
Gregory confessed to committing.80  Gregory was then questioned by 
police, again without an attorney, about a possible escape from the 
hospital; he initially denied escaping, but ultimately confessed.81   
During the trial in Family Court, Gregory’s treating 
psychiatrist at the hospital testified.82 Her testimony revealed that 
Gregory was a schizophrenic and his diagnosis “[w]ouldn’t keep 
[Gregory] from admitting to whatever he thought was expected so that 
he could get out of the immediate situation.”83  This court held that 
Gregory, a “12-year-old mentally disturbed child detained in custody 
for 24 hours with little or no sleep,”84 provided a coerced confession 
without proper due process protections; thus, Gregory’s confession 
given under these circumstances cannot be valid.85  Moreover, this 
court recognized that juvenile delinquency proceedings are “quasi-
 
74 Id.  
75 224 N.E.2d 102 (N.Y. 1966). 
76 Id. at 103. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 104, 105.  
79 Robert Daley, Youth House Acts to Drop Jail Aura, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 2 1964), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1964/10/02/youth-house-acts-to-drop-jail-aura.html (“Youth House, 
a private agency financed by city and state funds, holds juvenile offenders after arrest under 
the jurisdiction of the Family Court.  It is responsible for keeping the offender out of further 
trouble, and for seeing that he gets back in court for his hearing.”).  
80 In re W., 224 N.E.2d at 104. 
81 Id. at 105. 
82 Id. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 102. 
85 In re W., 224 N.E.2d at 102.  
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criminal in nature,”86 because of the potential “loss of personal 
freedom.”87  The court reinforced a legislative committee report, which 
provided that, “Any commitment––whether ‘civil’ or ‘criminal’, 
whether assertedly for ‘punitive’ or ‘rehabilitative’ purposes––
involves a grave interference with personal liberty.”88  Therefore, it 
follows that a litigant, whose personal liberties are at stake, is entitled 
to constitutional safeguards regardless of whether the proceeding is 
criminal or civil in nature.  
C. Greater Expansion of Constitutional Protections in All 
Civil Proceedings  
In 1967, after In re W., due process safeguards for juvenile 
delinquents were expanded following the United States Supreme Court 
case, In re Gault.89  In Gault, fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault made 
vulgar statements to a neighbor over the phone, and was subsequently 
taken into custody.90  The Arizona Juvenile Court consequently 
committed Gerald to the State Industrial School as a juvenile 
delinquent.91  The Court in Gault described the confinement of Gerald 
in the Industrial School as an incarceration, and therefore, a restraint 
on his freedom.92  The Court stated that, if Gerald were over eighteen 
years old at the time of this offense, the sentence would carry a fine 
and jail time, with a full gamut of constitutional protections guaranteed 
to him throughout such a proceeding.93  The Court followed its 
reasoning from Kent by acknowledging the necessity for constitutional 
due process in civil juvenile delinquency proceedings.94  Gault held 
that due process and fair treatment in juvenile delinquency proceedings 
 
86 Id. at 106. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 106 (quoting Report of Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization, Jan. 
30, 1962, at 8.). 
89 387 U.S. 1 (1967).  
90 Id. at 4.  Gerald was on probation for the theft of a wallet several months prior to this 
incident. Id. 
91 Id.   
92 Id. at 27.  
93 Id. at 29.  Specifically, “The United States Constitution would guarantee him rights and 
protections with respect to arrest, search, and seizure, and pretrial interrogation.” Gault, 387 
U.S. at 29. 
94 Id. at 30-31; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970) (“Civil labels and good 
intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile 
courts.”). 
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include a juvenile’s “right to notice of charges, to counsel, to 
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses and to [the] privilege 
against self-incrimination.”95 
The Gault Court emphasized that “fair, efficient and effective 
procedures”96 are of great import to avoid “inadequate or inaccurate 
findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy.”97  These 
procedures, according to the Court, “are our best instruments for the 
distillation and evaluation of essential facts from the conflicting welter 
of data that life and our adversary methods present.”98  Further, the 
truth is more likely to surface when a party has the ability to confront 
the other about his version of the disputed incident.99  In other words, 
due process procedural safeguards are necessary to uncover the truth 
or discover the fallacies by having the opportunity to either corroborate 
statements presented in court or to refute the statements.100  Thus, 
because of the adversarial nature of a civil juvenile delinquent 
proceeding, it follows that all parties in such a matter must be given 
equal due process protections, whether an individual is a juvenile or an 
adult.  
Although due process in Family Court proceedings is required 
to ensure fairness, a subject child’s interests must always be fully 
protected, first and foremost.  People ex rel. Fields v. Kaufmann101 
recognized that the State, in its role as parens patriae, is allowed to 
deviate from “strict adversary concepts” to maintain the “paramount 
 
95 Gault, 387 U.S. at 2.  
96 Id. at 18.  
97 Id. at 20. 
98 Id. at 21. 
99 Id.  
100 Gault, 387 U.S. at 21 (The Court opined that the mechanisms of due process assist in 
uncovering the veracity of information provided in a given proceeding, especially the ability 
to confront contradictory submissions.); see People ex rel. Fields v. Kaufmann, 193 N.Y.S.2d 
789, 789 (1st Dep’t 1959).  A family unit counselor as well as several mental health 
professionals submitted confidential reports to a Family Court judge to determine which parent 
would be awarded custody of the two subject children. Id. at 791.  The trial court judge made 
his determination for custody based on the record of the earlier Habeas Corpus hearing and 
the confidential reports, which were not part of the record, nor were these reports made 
available to the parents’ attorneys. Id. at 789.  The Appellate Court concluded that the trial 
court’s custody ruling was not proper based on the record lacking information from the 
confidential reports, which would have allowed the parties to further inquire about the content 
of said reports. Id. at 791.  The Appellate court further stated, “the contents may provide the 
source for the examination of the parties and witnesses by the Court and enable counsel to 
fully dissect any disputed facts.” Fields, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 793.  
101 193 N.Y.S.2d 789, 789 (1st Dep’t 1959). 
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welfare” of the child, which should trump the rights of the parents.102  
The due process protections now recognized in civil juvenile 
proceedings may and should be diminished if they conflict with the 
best-interest-of-the-child principles that the Family Court should 
always maintain as the top priority. 
III. THE FAMILY COURT SYSTEM IN NEW YORK   
A. The Doctrine of Parens Patriae  
Parens patriae is defined as “parent of the country,”103 and 
allows a State “to protect persons who are legally unable to act on their 
own behalf.”104  Specifically, in the United States, this has historically 
encompassed “children, mentally ill persons, and other individuals 
who are legally incompetent to manage their affairs.”105  This doctrine 
can be traced as far back as the old English common law system.106  
Underlying this doctrine is the principle that a State, through its judges, 
is obligated to “act as a superparent” to persons with a legal 
disability.107  Intertwined in the parens patriae doctrine is the best-
interests-of-the-individual principle, which imposes a duty on a State 
to act “for the protection of the individual and then only in his or her 
best interests.”108 In Family Court especially, “the court has a duty to 
insure that the best interests of children who have been placed in its 
care are safeguarded.”109  To accomplish this, a Court may be obligated 
to interject to protect a child’s best interest when necessary.110 
B. Creation of the Family Court Act in New York 
In New York, the Family Court Act,111 which established the 
Family Court itself, was implemented in 1962, and designed to handle 
 
102 Id. at 792. 
103 THE FREE DICTIONARY, LEGAL-DICTIONARY, by Farlex, Inc., http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/parens+patriae (last visited Mar. 6, 2017). 
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
106 Matter of Female S., 444 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831 (N.Y. County 1981). 
107 Id.  
108 Id.  
109 Id. at 832.  
110 LEGAL DICTIONARY, supra note 33.  
111 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (Westlaw through 2017). 
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all “familial dysfunction” within any given family.112  In addition, the 
New York Family Court “was created to be a special agency for the 
care and protection of the young and the preservation of the family.”113  
Full-time Law Professor at the Elisabeth Haub School of Law, Pace 
University, Professor Merril Sobie, dedicates his professional studies 
to children’s law and family law.114  Professor Sobie “published the 
official McKinney’s Commentaries to the Family Court Act and the 
Domestic Relations Law.”115 
In his Practice Commentaries on the Family Court Act, 
Professor Sobie provided that the “Family Court Act incorporates 
largely substantive provisions, and only relatively skeletal procedural 
framework.”116  Professor Sobie proffered that the vernacular used to 
describe the parties in Family Court proceedings “may seem to be a 
superficial artifice designed to escape the quasi-criminal aspect of 
some of the Court’s work.”117  Moreover, Professor Sobie recognized 
the “quasi-criminal” content heard in Family Court, but acknowledged 
the minimal procedural posture of the Family Court.118  Therefore, 
procedure in Family Court is flexible and not as strict as true criminal 
matters heard in criminal courts.119  Despite the “skeletal procedural 
framework,” Professor Sobie acknowledged that provisions of the 
Criminal Procedure Law do apply in juvenile cases.120  The adversarial 
nature in criminal matters is also prevalent in juvenile matters, 
particularly when dissolved couples with children are the litigants and 
they have competing interests.  The children’s best interest, however, 
should remain the top priority, despite the adversarial nature of these 
proceedings.121  
 
112 Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of N.Y. Book 29A, FAM. 
CT. ACT § 111 (Westlaw through 2017, ch. 1-7) [hereinafter Sobie, Practice Commentaries § 
111]. 
113 Matter of Female S., 44 N.Y.S.2d at 832 (quoting 1962 Report of Joint Legislative 
Committee on court reorganization No. 2 F.C.A. Committee Comments at 2).  
114 ELISABETH HAUB SCHOOL OF LAW PACE UNIVERSITY, http://law.pace.edu/faculty/merril-
sobie (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).  
115 Id. In addition, Professor Sobie has authored and co-authored a plethora of books, 
articles, studies, codes and commentaries all related to children’s and family law. Id.  
116 Sobie, Practice Commentaries § 111, supra note 112. 
117 Sobie, Practice Commentaries § 111, supra note 112. 
118 Sobie, Practice Commentaries § 111, supra note 112. 
119 Sobie, Practice Commentaries § 111, supra note 112. 
120 Sobie, Practice Commentaries § 111, supra note 112. 
121 Sobie, Practice Commentaries § 111, supra note 112. 
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C. Article 6 of the Family Court Act 
Section 651 of the Family Court Act provides the “Jurisdiction 
over habeas corpus proceedings and petitions for custody and 
visitation of minors.”122  Section 651 obtains its jurisdictional authority 
from “Article 6, Section 13 of the New York State Constitution,”123 
which provides, in relevant part, “The family court shall have 
jurisdiction . . . over the custody of minors except for custody 
incidental to actions and proceedings for marital separation, divorce, 
annulment or marriage and dissolution of marriage.”124  Professor 
Sobie proffered that this “[s]ection is devoid of substantive or 
procedural rules,”125 and simply offers a broad best interests of the 
child standard for general custody and visitation proceedings.126  
Although best interest of the child has never been explicitly defined, it 
often involves various factors a judge must assess with respect to what 
and who would be around the child during his/her temporary 
placement.127  In New York specifically, a judge is required to make 
his custody and visitation determination based on what will be best for 
the child’s health and safety.128  The only guidance on how to uphold 
this standard in custody and visitation proceedings is through common 
law, as there are no explicit procedural framework guidelines provided 
in the Family Court Act.129 
D. Article 10 of the Family Court Act 
Article 10 of the Family Court Act covers Child Protective 
Proceedings.130  Specifically, as stated in Section 1011, the purpose “is 
designed to establish procedures to help protect children from injury 
or mistreatment and to help safeguard their physical, mental, and 
emotional well-being.”131  In addition, due process in Section 1011 
 
122 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 651 (West, Westlaw through L.2017, ch. 1-7). 
123 Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y. Book 29A, FAM. 
CT. ACT § 651 (Westlaw through 2017, ch. 1-7) [hereinafter Sobie, Section 651]. 
124 N.Y. CONST. art. 6, §13(b).  
125 Sobie, Section 651, supra note 123.  
126 Sobie, Section 651, supra note 123. 
127 NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/family/ 
bestInterest.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2017).  
128 Id. 
129 Sobie, Section 651, supra note 123.  
130 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT, Art. 10 (West, Westlaw through L.2017, ch. 1-7). 
131 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1011 (West, Westlaw through L.2017, ch. 1-7).  
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provides that there might be instances when the Family Court may be 
required to intervene and advocate for a child’s needs, even if a child’s 
needs conflict with the desires of a parent.132  Professor Sobie 
acknowledged the lack of due process procedures contained in Article 
10, but avers that a State’s intervention against a parent’s wishes for 
her child “must be based on a due process of law.”133  Section 1011 
stresses the importance of protecting the child, and Professor Sobie 
agrees with this premise.134  Nevertheless, Family Court Lincoln 
procedures in Article 6 and Article 10 proceedings vary drastically 
with respect to maintaining the best interests of the child.  
IV. “TRUE” VS. “MODIFIED” LINCOLN HEARINGS  
Despite the often-criticized lackadaisical Family Court 
structure, profound, albeit conflicting, procedures are in place with 
respect to subject children testifying.135  Custody and Visitation 
proceedings pursuant to Article 6 utilize an interview method called a 
“true” Lincoln hearing, which provides full privacy and confidentiality 
for the subject children testifying.136  Conversely, “modified” Lincoln 
hearings in Abuse and Neglect proceedings pursuant to Article 10 do 
not offer the same levels of privacy and confidentiality to the subject 
children who are testifying.137  Family Court is expected to operate 
under a best-interest-of-the-child jurisprudence, but it seems to do so 
selectively and problematically.138 
 
132 Id.  
133 Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y. Book 29A, FAM. 
CT. ACT § 1011 (Westlaw through 2017, ch. 1-7) [hereinafter Sobie, Section 1011]; see U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV (“Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law.”); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The interest of 
parents in the care, custody and control of their children––is perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”); Stanley v. State of Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645, 651 (1972) (A parent has a fundamental right and interest in the “companionship, care, 
custody and management of his or her children”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
(1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the 
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can 
neither supply nor hinder.”).  
134 Sobie, Section 1011, supra note 133.  
135 CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19. 
136 CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19. 
137 CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19. 
138 This is the author’s opinion on the inconsistent Lincoln procedure used in Article 6 vs. 
Article 10 proceedings with respect to the privacy of the hearing and the confidentiality of the 
hearing transcripts.  
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In Custody and Visitation (Article 6) proceedings, the best-
interest-of-the-child jurisprudential approach is best exemplified in the 
New York Court of Appeals seminal case, Lincoln v Lincoln.139  
Lincoln involved a custody dispute between divorced parents.140  The 
Court was cognizant that the subject children’s “interests are 
paramount”141 and the “rights of their parents must, in the case of 
conflict, yield to that superior demand.”142  The Court also recognized 
that “limited modifications of the traditional requirements of the 
adversary system must be made, if necessary,”143 in custody 
proceedings, so long as it is for the benefit of the child.144 
To preserve the children’s best interest, the Lincoln Court 
permitted a private interview with the subject children without the 
parents or the parents’ counsel present.145  The Court, in dicta, 
proffered that, “It requires no great knowledge of child psychology to 
recognize that a child, already suffering from the trauma of a broken 
home, should not be placed in the position of having its relationship 
with either parent further jeopardized by having to publicly relate its 
difficulties with them,”146 as well as, placing the children in the 
precarious position of having to “openly choose between them.”147  
The Court ultimately concluded that private interviews are more likely 
to elicit accurate depictions from a child, while reducing the 
psychological harms to a child, than if a child was to testify in the 
conventional manner of open court.148  Particularly, children will be 
more inclined to “speak freely and candidly concerning their 
preferences,”149 regarding their parents and the children’s 
“confidences would be respected,”150 by not disclosing the testimony 
offered during the private interview.151  
 
139 247 N.E.2d 659 (N.Y. 1969). 
140 Id. at 660.  
141 Id.  
142 Id.  
143 Id.  
144 Lincoln, 247 N.E.2d at 660. 
145 Id. at 661.  
146 Id. at 660. 
147 Id. 
148 Id.  
149 Lincoln, 247 N.E.2d at 661. 
150 Id.  
151 Id.  
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Following the decision in Lincoln, these private in-camera 
interviews between the children, the Attorney for the Child and the 
presiding judge were subsequently referred to as Lincoln hearings.152  
A “true” Lincoln hearing can be held during or after a fact-finding 
hearing because it is a tool used to corroborate any evidence introduced 
during an Article 6 fact-finding hearing.153  “True” Lincoln hearings 
are conducted at the court’s discretion where it will be useful in 
providing a court with insight into the subject children’s best 
interests.154   
In determining whether a Lincoln hearing will be in the 
children’s best interest, a court will typically look at the age of the 
children, in addition to testimony made by others regarding the wishes 
of the subject children.155  With regard to a judge’s decision to conduct 
a Lincoln hearing, one court proffered that, “These considerations 
apply with equal force to children of all ages; indeed, it may be 
particularly important to ensure that older children have the 
opportunity to express their views in confidence, as their preferences 
are given great weight in custody proceedings.”156  Furthermore, 
sealing the hearing transcript and not releasing it to the parents or the 
parents’ counsel preserves the confidentiality of a “true” Lincoln 
hearing.157  This procedure is utilized to limit a parent’s access to the 
transcript or its contents, and thus, not exposing a child to the potential 
harm that could result from a parent finding out what his child said to 
the judge.158  
Subsequent to Lincoln, Family Courts also began conducting 
“modified” Lincoln hearings in Article 10 proceedings.159  These 
“modified” Lincoln hearings loosened the tight confidentiality reigns 
afforded in “true” Lincoln hearings,160 in which the child may incur 
more harm than benefit.161  A quintessential case describing a 
“modified” Lincoln hearing is In re Justin C.162  In Justin C., Petitioner 
 
152 CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19. 
153 Spencer v. Spencer, 925 N.Y.S.2d 227, 229 (3d Dep’t 2011).  
154 Angela F. v. Gail W., 879 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (3d Dep’t 2014).  
155 Id. 
156 Battin v. Battin, 12 N.Y.S.3d 672, 673 (3d Dep’t 2015). 
157 Cohen v. Cohen, 993 N.Y.S.2d 4, 8 (1st Dep’t 2014).  
158 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 859. 
159 CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19. 
160 CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19. 
161 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 859.  
162 903 N.Y.S.2d 806. 
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alleged that the Respondents utilized corporal punishment on her 
children and the father “had sexual intercourse with the daughter on at 
least 20 occasions.”163  The attorney for the subject daughter requested 
a “modified” Lincoln hearing, before the start of the fact-finding 
hearing to occur “in the presence of all counsel, but outside the 
presence of respondents,”164 with respondents’ attorneys having full 
permission to cross-examine the daughter.165  
The subject daughter in Justin C. gave sworn testimony in front 
of all counsel, the judge and a court stenographer, who compiled a 
written transcript of the “modified” Lincoln hearing testimony.166  The 
Family Court sealed the daughter’s testimony transcript and marked it 
as confidential prior to sending it to the Appellate Division, Third 
Department, after the father appealed the finding of abuse and neglect 
by the Family Court.167  Father’s appellate counsel moved to unseal 
the “modified” Lincoln hearing transcript asserting that the transcript 
was necessary, “to reference and make fact-specific arguments based 
upon that testimony.”168  Father’s appellate counsel argued that 
allowing the transcript to be left sealed “hampered her ability to 
adequately represent the father on appeal.”169  This motion was denied, 
but was appealed again to the Third Department, which ultimately 
vacated its prior decision and granted the father’s motion to unseal the 
transcript of the daughter’s “modified” Lincoln hearing.170  The Justin 
C. court reasoned that it is baseless to extend the same confidentiality 
safeguards to children in abuse and neglect cases as they are afforded 
in custody proceedings.171  
This court held that the testimony transcript of a child during 
an Article 10 proceeding, conducted in front of all counsel, with 
 
163 Id. at 807.  
164 Id.  
165 Id.  
166 Id.  
167 Justin C., 903 N.Y.S.2d at 807. 
168 Id.  
169 Id.  
170 Id.   
171 Id. at 808 (“While the issue at the fact-finding stage of a custody proceeding is what 
custodial arrangement is in the best interest of the child, the issue at the fact-finding stage of 
a Family Ct. Act article 10 proceeding is whether the petitioner has proved by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the child is neglected and/or abused and that the respondent is responsible 
for the neglect and/or abuse.  Most significantly, unlike a custody proceeding, the position of 
the allegedly neglected or abused child in an article 10 proceeding may be adverse to the 
respondent.”). 
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counsel having the opportunity to cross-examine the child, “may not 
be sealed,”172 because of the “fundamental due process concerns for 
the purposes of an appeal.”173  Having access to the child’s in camera 
testimony affords the respondents’ counsel an opportunity to confirm 
or discredit the statements made by the child.174  Parents accused of 
abuse or neglect invoke due process concerns because these 
accusations could result in a limitation on their constitutionally 
protected rights in the “companionship, care, custody and 
management”175 of their children.176  Thus, natural parents’ protected 
rights with respect to their children do not completely fall by the 
wayside as some due process is afforded to them in abuse and neglect 
proceedings.177    
However, this rationale is contrary to the best-interest-of-the-
children approach governing Family Court in Article 6 and Article 10 
proceedings.  Providing parents with access to their children’s private 
interview transcripts can create significantly more turmoil within the 
family.178  Parents with access to the Lincoln hearing transcript would 
be free to show anyone (other family members, friends, etc.) they want 
what their children said about them.179  It is possible that the family 
member or friend and even the parent would view the children in a 
negative light after having exposed what the children actually said 
 
172 Justin C., 903 N.Y.S.2d at 810. 
173 Id. at 809.   
174 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 862.  
175 Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 at 651.  
176 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 862.  
177 See In re B., 285 N.E.2d 288, 290 (1972).  The New York Court of Appeals reasoned 
that when a proceeding involves a natural parent’s constitutionally recognized interests in his 
child, a parent is entitled to due process, fundamental fairness and equal protection safeguards 
in the form of a “meaningful opportunity to be heard,” with the assistance of appointed legal 
counsel. Id. at 290.  The court further acknowledged the necessity for legal counsel in 
proceedings, which could result in a natural parent losing “a child’s society . . . ,” and 
becoming a ward of the State, by reasoning that counsel aid in closing the gap between the 
state and pro se litigants with respect to the “inherent imbalance of experience and expertise.” 
Id.  Providing an indigent parent with counsel insulates a parent from being blind-sided by an 
unfair proceeding lacking due process. Id.  A lay parent may not have the expectations of due 
process and fairness in proceedings like an experienced attorney would have, so it is essential 
for a parent to be afforded legal assistance; see N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 261 (West, Westlaw 
through L.2017, ch. 1-7) (“Counsel is often indispensable to a practical realization of due 
process of law and may be helpful to the court in making reasoned determinations of fact and 
proper orders of disposition.”).  
178 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 863.  
179 Id. at 862, 863.  
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about that parent further damaging the relationship.180  To guarantee 
no further damage to an already strained parent-children relationship, 
as well as to the children as individuals, sealing the Lincoln hearing 
transcript as is required in Article 6 proceedings is the best practice.181  
This practice should take priority over the competing parents’ due 
process concerns to uphold the best-interest-of-the-child foundation 
that Family Court is built on.  
V. THE SAME LINCOLN PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED IN           
ARTICLE 6 AND ARTICLE 10 PROCEEDINGS  
The competing interests of the children’s best interest and the 
parents’ due process rights between Article 6 and Article 10 
proceedings result in conflicting Lincoln procedures.  According to 
Section 2:84 of the New York Practice Series––New York Family 
Court Practice,182 the constitutional right to confront one’s accuser 
afforded to defendants in criminal matters is not applicable in Family 
Court Article 10 proceedings.183  However, the Family Court permits 
respondent’s counsel to cross-examine the child witness without the 
respondent parent present.184  The Family Court seeks to “protect a 
vulnerable child witness,”185 and accomplishes this by eliminating the 
child’s face-to-face confrontation with the respondent parent by using 
modifed Lincoln procedure.186  In fact, in Maryland v. Craig,187 the 
United States Supreme Court opined that a “State’s interest in the 
psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently 
important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant’s right to 
face his or her accusers in court.”188  Disputes involving children and 
their parents take the most significant toll on the children; thus, it is 
vital that the children be afforded the greatest protection possible.189  
 
180 Id. at 863.  
181 Sellen v. Wright, 645 N.Y.S.2d 346, 348 (3d Dep’t 1996).   
182 10 MERRIL SOBIE & GARY S. SOLOMON, NEW YORK PRACTICE SERIES – NEW YORK 
FAMILY COURT PRACTICE § 2:84 (Westlaw 2017 2d ed.) [hereinafter Sobie, Family Court 
Practice]. 
183 Sobie, Family Court Practice, supra note 182. 
184 CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19. 
185 Sobie, Family Court Practice, supra note 182. 
186 Sobie, Family Court Practice, supra note 182. 
187 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
188 Id. at 853. 
189 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 863.  
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At the same time, Section 2:84 also acknowledges that 
“excluding a respondent and his or her attorney becomes more 
problematical when a child witness’s testimony constitutes both the 
first detailed airing of the facts and the core of the petitioner’s case.”190  
In addition, Section 2:84 states that the respondent is not provided with 
an opportunity to rebut this evidence when Lincoln procedure is 
used.191  Not having the opporunity to dispute the petitioner’s evidence 
is especially prevalent if a judge’s finding is predicated only on 
unsworn testimony.192  Generally, a balancing test is applied to “weigh 
the importance of face-to-face confrontation and the potential 
prejudice to the respondent’s right to a fair hearing against the risk of 
harm to the child.”193  The inconsistencies in the Lincoln hearing 
procedures utilized in Article 6 and Article 10  proceedings need to be 
reconciled.  
The Lincoln hearings in Article 6 proceedings are tools used to 
“corroborate information acquired through testimonial or documentary 
evidence adduced during the fact-finding hearing.”194  On the other 
hand, these “modified” Lincoln hearings utilized in Article 10 
proceedings assist in proving “by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the child is neglected and/or abused and that the respondent is 
responsible for the neglect and/or abuse.”195  Article 10 proceedings 
appear to be more adversarial in nature.196  In addition, Section 1046 
of the Family Court Act of New York197 provides an exception to the 
hearsay rule of evidence, which admits a child’s prior hearsay 
statements into evidence.198  However, a child’s uncorroborated 
hearsay statements alone are insufficient to find abuse or neglect at 
fact-finding.199   
These allegations of abuse or neglect asserted against one party 
provide that fairness in procedure and due process offers the accused 
 
190 Sobie, Family Court Practice, supra note 182. 
191 Sobie, Family Court Practice, supra note 182. 
192 Sobie, Family Court Practice, supra note 182. 
193 Sobie, Family Court Practice, supra note 182. 
194 Spencer, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 229.  
195 Justin C., 903 N.Y.S.2d at 808.  
196 Id. at 810.  
197 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046 (Westlaw through L.2017, ch. 1-8). 
198 Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y. Book 29A, FAM. 
CT. ACT § 1011 (Westlaw through 2017, ch. 1-7).  
199  § 1046(a)(vi) (Westlaw).  
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party, through counsel, an opportunity to discredit the allegations.200  
In effect, the judge will then have the opportunity to determine whether 
the testimony has been sufficiently corroborated for a finding to be 
made.201  However, sufficient corroboration of a child’s hearsay 
statement can be accomplished through respondent’s counsel having 
“an opportunity to submit questions to be posed by the judge,”202 
through expert testimony,203 other third party testimony,204 or through 
the child’s own in camera testimony.205   
In Matter of Nicole V., 206 the court concluded that, “[D]ue 
process requirements are met by permitting a finding of abuse to be 
made on the basis of a child’s out-of-court statement which is 
corroborated by any competent, non-hearsay, relevant evidence          
which . . .  enhances the credibility of the child’s statements as to its 
material elements.”207  Furthermore, “any other evidence tending to 
support the reliability of the previous statements,”208 such as any 
“writing, record or photograph . . . made as a memorandum or record 
of any . . . event relating to . . . abuse or neglect,”209 is sufficient to 
corroborate a child’s hearsay statements.210  At the same time, the 
“testimony of the child shall not be necessary to make a fact-finding of 
abuse or neglect,”211 and corroboration is only required as evidence to 
the credibility of a child’s hearsay statement.212  The court in Nicole V. 
 
200 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 862. 
201 Id. at 862-63.  
202 Sobie, Family Court Practice, supra note 182. 
203 Matter of Victoria K., 650 N.Y.S.2d 390, 391-92 (3d Dep’t 1996) (“The therapist, who 
is a specialist in the field of child sexual abuse cases, testified that in her opinion, based on her 
interviews with the child and respondent, sexual abuse had occurred.  She testified that the 
child was spontaneous in her statements, suggesting that they were not rehearsed, and that the 
specific and consistent sexual detail that the child was able to articulate was strong evidence 
to support the child’s allegations.”).  
204 In re Sabrina M., 775 N.Y.S.2d 96, 98 (3d Dep’t 2004) (“Sabrina’s out-of-court oral and 
written statements were corroborated in key respects by the mother’s testimony, as well as the 
testimony of third parties regarding hearsay statements made by Ashley, the mother and 
respondent.”). 
205 In re Aaliyah B., 892 N.Y.S.2d 242, 243 (3d Dep’t 2009) (“Here, the child’s allegations 
of the sexual abuse were sufficiently corroborated by her sworn in-camera testimony detailing 
certain incidents of when, where and how the sexual abuse occurred.”).  
206 510 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1st Dep’t 1987), aff’d, 71 N.Y.2d 112 (1987).  
207 Id. at 572-73.  
208 § 1046(a)(vi) (Westlaw). 
209 Id. § 1046 (a)(iv).  
210 Id. § 1046 (a)(vi).  
211 Id. 
212 Matter of Nicole V., 510 N.Y.S.2d at 571.  
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proffered that the principal objective in Article 10 proceedings is to 
prevent further harm to physically and emotionally abused or 
neglected child victims.213  Because a child is not required to testify in 
Article 10 proceedings, assurances of full confidentiality protections 
should be given to incentivize a child if he or she so chooses to 
testify.214  Continuing to utilize the current “modified” Lincoln 
procedure in Article 10 proceedings is contrary to the objectives of 
protecting a child from further damage.215  The rights of parents should 
be secondary and outweighed by the rights of children when they are 
competing, like they are in Article 10 proceedings.216  
The argument regarding the need for the softer confidentiality 
measures in Article 10 Lincoln hearings because of natural parents’ 
due process and constitutional rights in raising their children should 
not carry as much weight as it is presently afforded.217  For example, 
an in camera inquiry was conducted in People v. Darden,218 a New 
York Court of Appeals criminal case governed by the Criminal 
Procedure Law and where constitutional protections are most 
prevalent.219  The Darden Court conducted an in camera inquiry for a 
confidential informant whose identity was better kept anonymous.220  
During this in camera inquiry, the judge instructed the parties that the 
“prosecutor may be present but not the defendant or his counsel.”221  In 
addition, the judge allowed defense counsel to submit a list of 
questions for the judge to ask the confidential informant on the 
defendant’s behalf.222  
Although the judge distributed a summary report of the 
informant’s testimony to both parties, the judge was significantly more 
 
213 Id. at 572. 
214 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 863.  
215 Id.   
216 Id. at 860.  
217 The Sandra Court stated, “A Parent in an Article 6 custody case has a no less significant 
due process right to know and meet the factual evidence that will determine his or her 
constitutionally protected right to the care and custody of his or her child.” Sandra S., 914 
N.Y.S.2d at 862.  Despite this fundamental right of a parent, courts keep the Article 6 Lincoln 
hearing transcripts sealed. Id. at 861.  It follows then that because the Sandra court is 
recognizing the significance of the parental rights in both Article 6 and Article 10 proceedings, 
the permissible Lincoln procedures in Article 6 should be applied in Article 10 proceedings as 
well. Id. at 862, 863.  
218 313 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1974). 
219 Id. at 52. 
220 Id. 
221 Id.  
222 Id.  
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concerned with keeping the identity of the informant anonymous to 
further protect effective law enforcement than it was in not disclosing 
the informant’s statements.223  The in camera in the case did not 
implicate any due process or fairness violations.224  An in camera, with 
defense counsel absent, where the transcript is sealed was utilized in a 
criminal case, which requires a higher burden of proof,225 and was 
found not to violate constitutional protections.226  It should follow then 
that the same in camera procedure, minus the summary report of the 
testimony that was distributed in Darden, can be implemented in a 
civil, Article 10 proceeding, which requires a lower burden of proof.227  
More importantly, utilizing the confidentiality standards seen 
in Article 6 proceedings and in Darden are necessary in Article 10 
proceedings to maximize protection of the subject children, which will 
prevent further psychological and emotional damage.  As previously 
mentioned, the Lincoln court recognized that it is essentially common 
sense to be aware of the potential harm to an already strained parent-
child relationship if that same child is forced to openly disclose the 
issues surrounding the relationship.228  In a blog post written by 
Rebecca Decoster,229 she affirmed, “Testifying in court is stressful for 
adults, more so for a child.  Cross-examination can be brutal.  The 
negative psychological impact of testifying against a parent in an 
emotionally-charged courtroom cannot be measured.”230   
Allowing a child’s private Lincoln hearing transcript to be left 
unsealed could have the same psychological effect, as the parent would 
be free to view the content of the transcript and share that transcript for 
anyone’s viewing pleasure.231  This can compound the trauma to 
 
223 Darden, 313 N.E.2d at 52.  
224 Id.  
225 CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/burden_of_proof 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2017) (providing that the burden of proof in criminal cases is on the 
prosecution to establish the fact of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).   
226 Darden, 313 N.E. 2d at 52. 
227 § 1046(b)(i) (Westlaw) (“[A]ny determination that the child is an abused or neglected 
child must be based on a preponderance of evidence,” during a fact-finding hearing).   
228 Lincoln, 247 N.E.2d at 660.  
229 Rebecca Decoster is a former associate attorney in Varnum, LLP, in Michigan, and a 
current referee with Oakland County Friend of the Court. 
230 Rebecca Decoster, Kids on the Hot Seat: Child Witnesses in Divorce, VARNUM LAW 
(Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.varnumlaw.com/blogs/varnum-etc/kid-on-the-hot-seat-child-
witnesses-in-divorce.  
231 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 859.  
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children.232  It can have significant adverse effects on any and 
potentially all familial relationships the children have, such as 
grandparents, aunts and uncles on both the maternal and paternal sides 
of the family.233  Judge J. Dean Lewis, the March 2007 editor of The 
Judge’s Page Newsletter,234 wrote, “The life of each child who has 
suffered abuse or neglect is critically affected by both the incident itself 
and the response of those who intervene.”235  Reunification of a family 
will not occur if it may result in the child being “retraumatized.”236 
Sarah Kroll,237 an attorney for the Children’s Law Center in 
Denver, Colorado, explained re-traumatization as “feelings that the 
traumatizing event . . . is happening to them again.”238  Further, 
children may suffer long-term, both physically and mentally, from the 
initial traumatic incident and any subsequent re-traumatization.239  It 
would be difficult for children, in a situation like this, to live 
comfortably and easily under the same roof as the parent who caused 
the original trauma.240  Whether it is a custody and visitation matter or 
an abuse and neglect matter, a presiding judge may issue an order 
removing the children from the home and placing them in the custody 
 
232 Id. at 863.  
233 Id.  
234 Judge J. Dean Lewis, The Judges’ Page Newsletter, COURT APPOINTED SPECIAL 
ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN, (Mar. 2007), http://www.casaforchildren.org/atf/cf/%7B992 
8CF18-EDE9-4AEB-9B1B-3FAA416A6C7B%7D/0702_children_and_youth_ involved_ in 
_ the_court_experience_issue_0119.pdf. 
235 Id.   
236 C.A. v. Indiana Department of Social Services, 15 N.E.3d 85, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).  
237 Sarah Kroll authored a 2015 article in Volume 35, Issue 3 of the Children’s Legal Rights 
Journal, 35 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 258 (2015), while attending Loyola University of Chicago, 
School of Law.   
238 Sarah Kroll, Opposing Viewpoints: The Sixth Amendment and Child Witnesses, 35 
CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 258, 258 (2015). 
239 Id.   
240 Id.  (“Making a child face their alleged attacker and answer questions about the traumatic 
crime against them can cause further harm to them, making their experience and the abuse 
against them that much worse.”); For example, it is common for the initial act of trauma to be 
triggered by things such as, “places, people, experiences, changes to his or body that occurred 
as a result of the trauma, or sensory stimuli that prompt memories of the original trauma.” 
Barbara Ryan, Judge Cynthia Bashant & Deena Brooks, Protecting and Supporting Children 
in the Child Welfare System and the Juvenile Court, 57 JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT 
JOURNAL, 61, 63 (Winter 2006) [hereinafter Ryan, Protecting and Supporting].  More 
specifically, “Exposure to rooms similar to those in which the trauma occurred; Exposure to 
sounds or smells that remind the child of the traumatic event; Exposure to voices or words 
connected with the trauma for the child; and, Exposure to the perpetrator of the trauma.” Ryan, 
Protecting and Supporting, supra note 240. 
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of someone other than the natural parent.241  It may be possible for 
children, placed with a relative after removal, to experience trauma 
reminders.242  In particular, the “words connected to the trauma” 
trigger may be pertinent if a parent gave access to a relative with whom 
the children are temporarily placed.243  For example, the relative could, 
accidentally or on purpose, utter the traumatizing words in the 
children’s presence, and thus, risk re-traumatization.244  Moreover, the 
trauma may be further compounded if the parent and other relatives 
know what the children said to the judge about the parent during the 
children’s Article 10 “modified” Lincoln hearing.245 
 The Court of Appeals of Indiana, in C.A. v. Indiana 
Department of Social Services,246 characterized re-traumatization as “a 
very negative thing because the more repeated trauma a child suffers, 
the less likely they are to heal.”247  This provides even more of a 
justification to leave the transcript sealed so it does not end up in the 
wrong person’s hands.  Re-traumatizing children by a parent having 
the ability to communicate the content of his children’s testimony to 
other family members would significantly undermine children’s best 
interests and would make the Article 10 goal of reunification 
impossible.248 
VI. CONCLUSION  
Upholding constitutional protections, even in civil matters, is 
undoubtedly of great import.249  However, when upholding these 
fundamental protections come at the expense of children, specifically 
in Family Court where litigants do not have the same constitutional 
protections as in criminal court, the protections must yield in favor of 
the best interests of the children.250  Family Court judges are expected 
 
241 Tompkins County Court, The Family Court and You! (A Citizen’s Guide to the Family 
Court), NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ 
6jd/tompkins/family/you.shtml#top. (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).  
242 Ryan, Protecting and Supporting, supra note 240, at 63.  
243 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 859. 
244 Id.  
245 Id. at 863.  
246 15 N.E.3d 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 
247 Id.  
248 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 863.  
249 See discussion supra Section II.C. 
250 See discussion supra Section II.C. 
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to protect the best interests of subject children both within the four 
walls of their courtrooms, especially during the sensitive and 
emotional proceedings of Article 6 and Article 10, and when the 
subject children are outside of Family Court.251  
Lincoln hearings are conducted in both proceedings to protect 
children’s best interests by preventing them from openly choosing 
between their parents for Custody and Visitation and reliving the initial 
traumatic experience by testifying in open court in Abuse and Neglect 
proceedings.252  It is ironic that, as it stands, the often more traumatic 
experiences related to Abuse and Neglect (Article 10) matters receive 
less strict protection when compared to the protections offered in 
Custody and Visitation (Article 6) matters.253  Accordingly, the strict 
confidential Lincoln hearing procedures utilized in Article 6 matters, 
namely both parents and their attorneys being prohibited from 
participating in the hearing and the hearing transcript remaining sealed, 
should be adopted in full for Article 10 proceedings.254  This will 
provide full protection for the subject children and guarantee that the 
subject children will not be re-traumatized ensuring the children’s best 
interests.255  
Therefore, the ultimate goal of protecting children and doing 
what is in their best interests would be more attainable, and the risk of 
re-traumatization to the children would be substantially reduced if all 
stages of Article 10 proceedings remain highly confidential tantamount 
to the Article 6 proceedings.256  This would ensure that the court acts 
in the best interests of the children, and make family reunification in 
Article 10 proceedings a realistic, absolute goal to be reached within 
the twelve-month standard from the commencement of a 
proceeding.257  
 
 
251 See discussion supra Section III.A.  
252 See discussion supra Section IV.   
253 See discussion supra Section IV.  
254 See discussion supra Section V. 
255 See discussion supra Section V.  
256 See discussion supra Section V.  
257 See discussion supra Sections I and V.  
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